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TRADE REGULATION
FAIR TRADE LAWS-NON-APPLICABILITY TO HORIZONTAL
PRICE FIXING.
Substantially all the tobacco wholesalers of Ohio agreed to a
schedule of minimum retail prices for competing brands of cigarettes.
Form contracts, pledging adherence to the prices so set, were signed
by numerous retailers upon distribution by individual wholesalers.
When defendant drug store, a non-signer but with notice of the
agreements, undersold these prices, plaintiff retailer sought injunc-
tive protection. The judgment of the Common Pleas court granting
the injunction was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In affirming
the reversal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the contracts, in
effect, constituted horizontal agreements and as such were illegal
under Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 6402-6.1 Rayess v. Lane Drug Co., 138
Ohio St. 4oi, 2o Ohio Op. 514 (i94).
The universal clause in all fair trade acts condemning horizontal
price fixing3 may be likened to the prohibition in the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act against monopolistic practices;4 in both situa-
tions the probable purpose of inclusion was more to cushion a basic
shift in anti-trust policy' than to condition the dynamics of the new
legislative relaxation of the rigors of full competition. But despite
this origin, Ohio G. C. §64o2-6 and its counterparts are potentially
available to counsel and courts for judicial braking of the drift to-
ward price-fixing in distribution. As an instance of such judicial
action, the principal case commands attention. On its face, it is
true, the decision is limited in significance as an indicator of suc-
' This section provides "that this act shall not apply (in removing price fixing con-
tracts from the operation of state anti-trust laws) to any contract or agreement between
producers or between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or resale prices.
2The Fair Trade laws, now enacted in 45 states, are alike in excepting horizontal
contracts from the legality given to resale price maintenance.
3 48 STAT. 195, 196, National Industrial Recovery Act, Sec. 3a (2), provided, "that
such codes are not designed to promote monopolies . . . that such codes shall not permit
monopolies or monopolistic practices."
4Gulick, Sone Economic Aspects of the N. I. R. A. (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 1103,
at 1145, remarks on this shift in philosophy. And see dissenting opinion in Ely Lilly
Co. v. Sanders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E. (2d) 528 (1939), for a discussion of the trend
against the theories of the antitrust laws.
In Frank Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Store, 129 N. J. Eq. 105, 19 A.
(2d) 454 (1941), an agreement by manufacturers of two different products, permitting
their sale, as a combination, at a fixed price was declared invalid. This agreement is
obviously a much different type of horizontal price fixing than that of the principal case.
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cessful modes of attack through the excepting clauses; the factual
picture carried on its face an unmistakable mark of price-fixing on
the horizontal level which would probably have induced a like judicial
reaction in any other court. Yet it appears to be practically6 the
first decision wherein a court has declared a specific fact pattern to
constitute a horizontal restraint, and suggests the possibilities for
alert counsel in less obvious situations.
Eminent critics, though their opinions have been controverted by
others,', testify to the fact that legislative tolerance of resale price
maintenance greatly facilitates price restraints of a horizontal char-
acter.7  Thus, under the aegis of protective legislation, organized
retailers, chiefly through highly efficient fair trade committees, force
manufacturer adoption of a standard mark-up for competing prod-
ucts.' Such procedure, which is far from uncommon,9 rigidifies
one of the large cost elements in price determination, and to that
extent produces horizontal restraint. Disposition of several recent
New York actions attests the possibilities pregnant in an attack built
upon these premises. In these instances, an association of liquor re-
tailers had, by threatening to boycott distiller brands, coerced the
manufacturers into adopting an agreed-upon margin of 4o percent
for all liquors. Supposedly, the prices were set by the vertical con-
tracts signed by retailers; but yet, when confronted with the proposi-
I Among whom are SELIGMAN AND LOVE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE,
(1932), p. 259-263.
7Thurman Arnold, Ass't Attorney-Gen'l. of U. S., has criticized resale price mainte-
nance in "that it sanctions arrangements inconsistent with the anti-trust laws and becomes a
cloak for many conspiracies in restraint of trade which go beyond the limits established in
the amendment." 13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE T. N. E. C., VERBATim RECORDS, 69. For a
convincing discussion to the effect that horizontal collusion has beenl engendered by the
,lilkrTydings Amendment (federal resale price maintenance law), see the memorandum
of Corwin Edwards, Chief Economic Consultant for the Anti-Trust Dept. reprinted in
VERBATIM! RECORDS, supra, Vol. 13, p. 69. See also, Final Report of T. N.E. C. (1941) 33.
-4 For the view that prices so set tend to be uniform as to competing products since
the retailers usually demand an identical mark-up (through the recommendation of Fair
Trade committees with which most manufacturers negotiate) and so result in horizontal
rt-iraint, see 13 T. N. E. C. VrERBATIm REcoRDS, p. 206.
A sAcs manager for a large drug company said, "The committees (Fair Trade)
are not permitted, supposedly, by law to dictate what the minimum prices shall be, but
they are doing just that by refusing to approve contracts containing prices which do not
give the retailers what they consider a fair profit." Quoted in Nelson and Klein, Price
Behav ior and B:,sincss Policy, (1941) T. N. E. C. MONOGRAPH No. 1, at 88-89. The fact
that editorials in the National Association of Retail Druggists journals have repeatedly
warned the retailers not to engage in boycotting or attempting to set the prices would
- em to indicate the possible existence of such practices. See the issues of March 7,
1940, 1. 325 and Jan. 6, 1940, p. 736.
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tion that a horizontal combination existed, plaintiff association
dropped its suits against the price cutters.' 0
Not only is there this contention that legitimization of resale
price maintenance disburdens horizontal price restraints; it has been
urged with equally strong authority that it is " . . nearly always im-
possible for one manufacturer to establish a system of vertical price
fixing unless he can be sure that his competitors will do likewise.
Consequently, this type of horizontal collusion has been an indis-
pensable part of the movement -for resale price maintenance." 11 But
despite such testimony that combination on this expressly forbidden
plane often occurs as a means to effective realization of resale price
maintenance, apparently a recent New Jersey decision 12 provides the
only illustration, beyond the similar instant case, of counsel sug-
gesting the possibility of vertical contracts cloaking an illegal com-
bination. There, though the prices set were uniform in several
hundred contracts, prepared by twelve different wholesalers, the
court would not infer a horizontal restraint among the wholesalers
in the absence of proof of an express agreement. This holding in-
dicates the exactness of proof which may be required; nevertheless,
the ruling of the Ohio court in the principal case may presage a
renewed effort on the part of counsel and courts to uncover the ex-
isting illegality present in many Fair Trade contracts.
L. B. C.
10 For a discussion of the cases and their implications, see Trade Liquor War to the
Finish, (Sept. 23, 1940) TiaE 'MA. 69.
"Edwards, supra note 8, in 13 PROCEEDINS OF T. N. E. C., VERBATs RECORD (1940)
63. Equally strong is the judgment of GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE
REGULATION (1939) 380.
12 Pazen v. Silver Rod Stores, 129 N. J. Eq. 128, 18 A. (2d) 576 (1941).
